Who is making the decisions in Iran?

A question has been hanging over Tehran since the initial attacks in the current war between the United States and Israel against Iran: who is in charge? Formally, the answer is clear. Mojtaba Khamenei assumed the role of supreme leader following the death of his father, Ali Jamenei, on the first day of the war, on February 28. In the Islamic Republic system, this post was designed to be decisive. The leader has the final say on almost everything that matters: war, peace, and the strategic direction of the state. But in practice, the picture is much more diffuse. US President Donald Trump has described Iran’s leadership as “fractured” and suggested the White House is waiting for Tehran to come up with a “unified proposal.” Unity was certainly on the minds of Iranian leaders when they distributed a message to the population on their cellphones on Thursday night saying that “there is no radical or moderate in Iran: there is only one nation, one course.” An invisible leader Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since coming to power. Apart from a handful of written statements — including one insisting that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed — there is little direct evidence of its day-to-day control. Iranian officials acknowledged he was injured in the initial strikes but offered few details. The New York Times, citing Iranian sources, reported this week that he may have suffered multiple injuries, including injuries to his face that would have made it difficult for him to speak. And your absence matters. In Iran’s political system, authority is not only institutional but also performative. Ali Jamenei signaled his intentions through speeches, carefully calibrated appearances, and visible arbitrations between factions. This signaling function is now largely absent. The result is a void of interpretation. Some maintain that Mojtaba Jamenei’s wartime rise simply did not allow him to establish authority in his own way. Others point to information about his injuries and question whether he is capable of actively managing the system. In any case, decision-making appears less centralized than before the war. Diplomatic channels open, but only a little On paper, diplomacy falls to Masoud Pezeshkian’s government. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi continues to represent Tehran in talks with the US. But neither appears to be defining strategy, and their authority is further thrown into doubt by the fact that the Iranian delegation is led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. Araghchi’s role appears more operational than decision-making. His brief back-and-forth over whether the Strait of Hormuz was open or closed — he first suggested that traffic had resumed and quickly retracted it — offered a rare glimpse of how little the diplomatic channel controls military decisions. Pezeshkian, in turn, aligned himself with the general orientation of the Islamic Republic without visibly shaping it. Considered a relatively moderate figure, the Iranian president has so far avoided pushing an independent line. The delays in the second round of talks with the US in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, reinforce this point. Even when diplomatic channels are open, the system appears unable or unwilling to compromise. An expanding military field Control of the Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s most immediate source of leverage. But decisions about its closure fall to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IGRG), led by Ahmad Vahidi, not the diplomatic team. This puts real power in the hands of actors operating behind closed doors. Unlike previous crises, there is no single identifiable figure who clearly owns the strategy. Instead, a pattern emerges: actions first, messages second — and not always coherently. In practice, it is the actions of the CGRI — whether in enforcing the closure of Hormuz or in attacking targets across the Gulf — that appear to dictate the pace of the crisis. Political and diplomatic responses often follow these decisions rather than lead them. This does not necessarily signal a rupture in administrative spheres. But it suggests that the operational autonomy of the CGRI expanded, at least temporarily, in the absence of clear political arbitration. Qalibaf advances In the midst of this ambiguity comes Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. Former commander of the Revolutionary Guard and current president of Parliament, Qalibaf has become one of the most visible figures of the moment. He inserted himself into the negotiations, spoke to the public and, at times, framed the war in pragmatic rather than ideological terms. Within Parliament and conservative circles, resistance to negotiations remains strong. The hard-line message has intensified, and state media and public campaigns increasingly present the negotiations as a sign of weakness in the face of the country’s enemies. Qalibaf’s position is therefore precarious: active but not clearly authorized. The speaker of the Iranian Parliament insists that his actions are in line with Mojtaba Jamenei’s wishes, but there is little visible evidence of direct coordination. In a system that relies on signals from the top, this ambiguity is telling. Coherence declared or exercised? Altogether, these dynamics point to a system that works, but is not managed in a coherent manner. The authority of the supreme leader exists, but is not exercised visibly. The Presidency is aligned, but does not lead. Diplomacy is active, but not decisive. The military establishment has key levers, but without a clear public architect. Political figures advance, but without clear legitimacy. This is not a breakdown. The Islamic Republic remains intact. But it suggests something more subtle: a system struggling to convert the influence it possesses — for example, the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz — into a defined strategy at a time of acute pressure. It can still act on multiple fronts, but has difficulty signaling a clear direction to its own centers of power. And in Iran’s political model, coherence is maintained through appointments. For now, the system resists the pressure, maintains control and avoids any visible collapse despite the increasing pressure. However, the question increasingly arises as to whether coherence is being practiced or merely declared. This text was translated and reviewed by our journalists using AI, as part of a pilot project Ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel is extended for three weeks, says Trump US boarding ship with Iranian oil, and Trump authorizes firing on mines in the Strait of Hormuz Trump to the BBC: Iran ‘is dying to make a deal’

Source link