‘Cut off one head and others will grow’: why the Iranian regime remains difficult to overthrow

Experts say Iran’s power structure guarantees the regime’s longevity. Getty Images via BBC More than forty years after the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran faces the most serious crisis in its history. Joint US and Israeli airstrikes have killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top military commanders and damaged essential infrastructure. 🗒️Do you have any reporting suggestions? Send to g1 Washington and Tel Aviv have made it clear that they want regime change, encouraging the Iranians to overthrow their government. Still, experts say Iran has deliberately built a robust and enduring power structure that is difficult to dismantle. What explains this resilience — and why does it differ from that of other Middle Eastern countries? See the videos trending on g1: See the videos trending on g1 ‘Iranian Hydra’ Who holds power in Iran BBC Since the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, the Islamic Republic has gradually built a political system designed to withstand crises, experts say. This system combines tightly controlled institutions, ideological indoctrination, elite cohesion and a fragmented opposition. “It’s a structure similar to Hydra (a mythological monster with a dragon’s body and several serpent heads, which were reborn when cut): you cut off one head and others grow,” says Sébastien Boussois, Middle East researcher at the European Geopolitical Institute, in Belgium. On Sunday, Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Khamenei’s son, was chosen as his successor, less than two weeks after his father’s death. He is expected to continue his father’s hard line. New Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, tends to maintain the hard line adopted by his father. Getty Images via BBC ‘Polydictatorship’ Experts say that, unlike countries in the Middle East or North Africa such as Tunisia, Egypt and Syria — where leaders have been overthrown — Iran has been able to resist external pressure more effectively thanks to a security apparatus strongly motivated by ideology. According to Bernard Hourcade, former director of the French Research Institute on Iran, based in Tehran, the country does not function as a traditional dictatorship centered on a single leader, but as a “polydictatorship”: an alliance between defenders of political Islam and intense Iranian nationalism. Power is distributed among several spheres — clerical institutions, armed forces and strategic sectors of the economy — which makes the system much more difficult to overthrow than regimes based on a single leader. Among the most influential bodies is the Council of Guardians, responsible for vetoing laws and filtering candidates for elections, further reducing the chances of any faction seriously challenging the State. Although Iran is widely classified as an autocracy, it offers citizens the symbolic possibility of voting in some elections, including the choice of president. However, the process is tightly controlled, with candidates evaluated by the Guardian Council according to criteria such as loyalty to the Islamic Republic. The central role of the Revolutionary Guard If institutions form the skeleton of the regime, the security forces are widely seen as its muscle. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (ICG), which operates alongside the regular army, is often described as the “backbone of the regime”, says Hourcade. In addition to its military function, the Guard became a political and economic power, with vast business interests and influence exercised through the Basij militia, a volunteer paramilitary organization. A crucial point is that security forces remained unified in the face of successive waves of protests. For Boussois, this cohesion is deeply linked to ideology: “This culture of martyrdom present among Shiites and in groups like Hamas and Hezbollah is almost considered part of the work,” he says. Deputy Defense Minister Reza Talaeinik recently declared on TV that each Guard commander has designated successors up to three levels below, ensuring operational continuity. Kasra Aarabi, head of Guard research at the US organization United Against Nuclear Iran, argues that Iran’s decentralized structure was shaped by lessons from the collapse of Iraqi forces in 2003 during the US-led invasion. If the regime continues to stand, he believes that “the Guard will play an even more important role.” Patronage networks and elite cohesion A large part of the Iranian economy is controlled by organizations linked to the State, such as bonyads — charitable foundations that, over time, came to control thousands of companies in different sectors. These networks distribute jobs and contracts to groups loyal to the regime. The Revolutionary Guard’s vast business empire, which includes the Khatam al-Anbia conglomerate, reinforces this patronage system. Although Western sanctions have caused profound damage to the Iranian economy, these structures help protect elites and preserve their interest in the continuity of the system, experts say. According to Boussois, the arrangement is “so solid that we hardly see defections.” Ideology and the legacy of the revolution Religion also plays a central role in preserving power in Iran. The revolution established an enduring network of religious, political, and educational institutions that continue to shape the state’s worldview. “This very old and very powerful structure — ideological, bureaucratic, administrative — makes the system strong,” says Boussois. For him, ideology “functions as a true source of unity, vocation and recruitment”. A divided opposition Historically, the Iranian opposition has been marked by fragmentation. It brings together reformists, monarchists, left-wing groups, diaspora movements — such as the National Council of Resistance of Iran — and various ethnic organizations. This division is not new, notes Ellie Geranmayeh, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. After the revolution, the debate about the creation of political parties was put aside, largely because the country went to war with Iraq in 1980, a conflict that lasted almost eight years. According to Geranmayeh, over time, moderate factions were “marginalized, discredited or arrested” by both the regime and hard-line groups. There have been large waves of anti-government protests — such as the 2009 Green Movement and the demonstrations triggered by the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 — but these movements lacked centralized leadership and were harshly repressed. The most recent wave of protests, this year and last, was driven by appeals from the exiled son of the last shah (king). Iran also maintains one of the most sophisticated surveillance systems in the region, using frequent internet shutdowns, AI monitoring and cyber units that target activists abroad. Public Caution—And Why It’s Starting to Erode For many years, much of the Iranian population was hesitant to push for regime change, influenced by what they saw in the U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Geranmayeh says. The Arab Spring further reinforced this caution. According to her, however, this calculation has changed. Many Iranians have come to feel that the state is no longer able to guarantee basic needs — from jobs to clean water — while intensifying violent repression. January’s brutal crackdown on a new wave of protests — in which thousands were killed following some of the largest demonstrations the country has ever seen — accelerated this change, he adds. Hourcade also notes the existence of a “generational gap” in the way Iranians view the regime. Younger people, many of them highly educated, connected to the world and influenced by social networks, reject the system, which they consider “corrupt, oppressive and irrelevant to their aspirations”, he argues. ‘Every regime ends one day’ Analysts say authoritarian regimes tend to fall when three conditions align: Mass mobilization Divisions among ruling elites Defections from security forces In the past, Iran has often experienced the first but not the other two, experts say. Hourcade believes the end of the Islamic Republic is inevitable but not imminent. “Every regime ends one day. The real question is time — chronology.” He argues that Khamenei’s death was a major blow to the regime. “There will be no other like him. His replacement will never have the authority that Khamenei had.” But Boussois says the fall of the Islamic Republic is far from certain. If it happens and is triggered by foreign military intervention, what comes next could be worse, he says. Trump previously told the New York Times that the US capture of former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro would be the “perfect scenario” for Iran. But Boussois says: “The opposite could occur — as in North Korea or Cuba — a strengthening of the regime’s hard core.”

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