Can Trump replicate in Iran the solution he achieved in Venezuela after Maduro’s arrest?

Donald Trump suggested that the outcome of the war against Iran could resemble that achieved in Venezuela Getty Images via BBC Eliminate the leader and reach an agreement with figures from the state apparatus itself to build a political and commercial relationship favorable to the United States. This is, in essence, the strategy that allowed American President Donald Trump to open a new stage of cooperation with the Venezuelan government after the capture of former president Nicolás Maduro in early January (3/1). However, what happened in Venezuela with apparently surprising ease seems much more complicated in the case of Iran. See the trending videos on g1 See the trending videos on g1 The US and Israel eliminated the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and some of the Islamic Republic’s main power figures after several days of airstrikes that triggered a regional war in the Middle East. Trump suggested that the result could be similar to that achieved in Venezuela and even insinuated that a government, especially a new leader, willing to cooperate with the US could emerge in Iran. “I have to be involved in his appointment, like with Delcy in Venezuela”, declared the US president this Thursday (5/3), days after defining the current situation in Venezuela as “the perfect scenario” for Iran. Delcy Rodríguez told US Interior Secretary Doug Burgum on Wednesday (4/3) that his government is willing to cooperate with Trump’s. Getty Images via BBC However, successfully executing this strategy for Iran presents important challenges: it is much more populous (around 92 million inhabitants, compared to 28 million in Venezuela) and has a more powerful Army, a fundamentalist clerical elite and a heterogeneous society in which different social and religious currents and identities coexist, including separatist minorities. Could the US replicate its power transition formula applied in Venezuela in Iran? Differences The comparison between Venezuela and Iran reveals profound differences, starting with the very nature of US military operations in both scenarios. In Caracas, it was a quick and limited incursion: last 3/1, US special forces bombed military targets and captured then-president Nicolás Maduro, who was transferred to New York (USA) along with his wife to face charges of drug trafficking and terrorism. Just a few days later, the then vice president of Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez, assumed power on an interim basis, and Venezuelan state institutions continued to function. The attack against Iran was very different: the US and Israel launched a much broader offensive against the country’s military and political structure, with attacks against thousands of targets — from missile installations to command centers — that ended the lives of Ayatollah, Ali Khamenei, and other people who held high positions in the Iranian regime. The operation triggered a new war in the Middle East that threatens to expand and affect the economy and security on a global scale. “I don’t believe Venezuela’s strategy is realistic for Iran,” explains Iranian-American analyst Sina Toosi, principal researcher at the Washington-based Center for International Policy think tank, in an interview with BBC News Mundo (BBC’s Spanish-language news service). The Iranian Army is much larger and better equipped than the Venezuelan one. Getty Images via BBC In Venezuela, points out Toosi, the Americans “eliminated the main figure and reached an agreement with the rest of the regime, while in the Iranian case they ended Khamenei, but the rest of the regime remains in power. There is no agreement with them and the country, its government and its army continue to counterattack ferociously.” Another factor comes into play here: Iran has a much higher defense capacity than Venezuela, with military spending between three and four times greater, the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and its own industry that, despite decades of international sanctions, manufactures projectiles en masse, drones and other advanced weapons systems. “Trump previously had quick, easy, and politically favorable military victories — the capture of Maduro and the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025 — and he thought maybe he could achieve something quickly and quickly. But that’s not what’s happening now,” concludes Toosi. The political challenge In any case, even if the US and Israel completely neutralize their enemy’s defense system, the political scenario in Iran presents serious difficulties. After years of economic crisis and social division, the Venezuelan political apparatus was highly concentrated around the presidential figure and a relatively small circle of leaders. Iran, in turn, has a much more complex political architecture: since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, power has been distributed among religious institutions, elected bodies and military structures such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran. This arrangement was designed to guarantee the continuity of the regime even if it is decapitated, with succession mechanisms such as the process of choosing the supreme leader through the Assembly of Experts (a clerical body of 88 members elected by popular vote for terms of eight years). This reinforces the institutional resilience of the system and, above all, indicates that the death of the ayatollah does not necessarily imply a collapse or political change. The Iranian regime is designed to survive even if its top leaders disappear. Getty Images via BBC “Changing this structure, bringing about real regime change, is not just about killing Khamenei or bombing facilities. It will require troops on the ground and huge regime change efforts,” predicts Toosi. It is also necessary to take into account the religious component of the Islamic Republic, which defines itself as a political system based on Shiite clerical authority and claims an ideological legitimacy distinct from that of other conventional authoritarian governments. This implies that its leaders tend to interpret external pressures as an existential threat, which reinforces internal cohesion in times of crisis and makes it difficult to find agents willing to align themselves with US demands. A ‘Delcy’ in Iran? Delcy Rodríguez, then Venezuelan Foreign Minister, in a meeting in Tehran in 2015 with Hassan Rouhani, who was the president of Iran. Getty Images via BBC BBC News Mundo asked Toosi, from the Center for International Policy, if it would be possible to find a figure like Delcy Rodríguez among the men who make up Iran’s power elite, where more moderate and pragmatic factions coexist that have historically acted as a counterpoint to the dominant hard line in Iran. internal politics. The expert responds that “if Washington wants a trusted leader in Iran, it will have much more difficulty than in Venezuela, which is in the US’s backyard and is much easier to interfere and shape.” “If we talk about figures like Ali Larijani [chefe de segurança do Irã]Masoud Pezeshkian [presidente do Irã] or other members of the system, will they reach an agreement with Trump to recognize Israel or eliminate its nuclear and missile programs? This seems very unlikely to me if this structure continues to exist”, he says. And he adds: “Even if they found a more moderate figure and tried to reach an agreement with him and put him in power, how would he get there? Would he get enough support from the Revolutionary Guard, the clergy and the regime’s traditional base? I also don’t see this as something viable.” Experts consider it unlikely that President Masoud Pezeshkian (center) or other figures from what remains of the Iranian leadership will want to negotiate with the US. Getty Images via BBC Apart from politics, the composition of Iranian society is also an important factor to be considered: while Venezuela is a relatively homogeneous country from a religious and ethnic point of view, the Persian nation presents greater complexity. In the Islamic Republic, different ethnic minorities coexist, from Arabs to Kurds, Baluch or Azeris, concentrated mainly in border regions and historically considered potential hotbeds of instability. Experts believe that this diversity introduces additional risks in any attempt at political transition, as some of these groups could take advantage of the temporary weakness of the system to take control by force in certain regions or establish militias that destabilize the process. Venezuela does not have the ability to project military or political power beyond its immediate surroundings. Iran, in turn, is a central actor in the Middle East, where it maintains a network of allies and militias in different countries, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, which has in fact already expanded the scope of the ongoing war. even a transition”, says Toosi. Furthermore, its geographical position is central to global energy trade: the Strait of Hormuz, whose waters bathe the western Iranian coast, is a mandatory passage for 20% of global oil transport. Until last Saturday, around 20 million barrels passed through this strait daily, representing an annual value of more than US$500 billion (around R$2.5 trillion). Toosi, from the Center for International Policy, assesses that Iran “It could move towards a scenario of civil war or collapse” if the conflict persists, something that carries risks for all parties. “We must remember that the country extends from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, at the crossroads between Asia, Africa, Europe and Eurasia, so a destabilized Iranian plateau, with more than 90 million people, would have repercussions for a long time”, he says, gives the ayatollahs’ regime a strong incentive to. resist for as long as possible: Iran knows that prolonging the war would imply high costs for the West and the world in economic and geopolitical terms, so it trusts that, at some point, its adversaries will choose to interrupt the offensive and negotiate an agreement that guarantees its continuity. Another element that differentiates the Iranian case from the Venezuelan one is the involvement of a fundamental external actor: the State of Israel. While the Trump administration could welcome an agreement with Iran that implies the continuity of the Islamic Republic — as is the case. for now, with Chavismo in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela — the government of Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu intends to put an end to the Ayatollahs’ regime once and for all. “Even if Trump wanted to reach an agreement with this regime, Netanyahu and the Israelis said they want it to disappear. They would probably prefer chaos or even the implosion of Iran to such an agreement”, says Toosi. Toosi adds that, given the enormous influence of the Israeli lobby on the US government, the objective of completely ending the Iranian theocracy “is present in Trump’s ear, which marks another very important difference in relation to the case of Venezuela”.

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