Why Iran’s response to US attack may be different this time

A naval strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln would have already arrived in the Middle East. Mike Blake/Reuters The arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in the US Central Command zone of responsibility, near Iranian waters, has deepened the sense that a major confrontation may be taking shape. Amid the most extensive and violent crackdown on protests in Iran’s recent history, the military deployment highlights how Washington and Tehran may be closer to direct confrontation than at any time in recent years. Read also: Photos of the faces of hundreds of dead people leaked to the BBC amid the brutal repression of protests in Iran Iranian leaders find themselves under pressure between protests that increasingly demand the overthrow of the regime and an American president who keeps his intentions deliberately obscure, fueling anxiety not only in Tehran, but throughout the region — which is normally already marked by instability. Iran’s response to a possible American military strike may not follow the familiar, carefully calibrated pattern seen in previous confrontations with Washington. President Donald Trump’s recent threats, in the context of violent suppression of domestic instability, came at a time of exceptional internal tension for the Islamic Republic. Therefore, any American attack now carries a significantly greater risk of rapid escalation, both regionally and within Iran. In recent years, Tehran has demonstrated a preference for further, limited retaliation. Following United States attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21 and 22, 2025, Iran responded the next day with a missile attack on the US-operated al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. According to President Trump, Iran had warned in advance of the attack, which allowed anti-aircraft defenses to intercept most of the missiles. No deaths were recorded. The attack was widely interpreted as a deliberate attempt by Iran to signal its resolve while avoiding a larger war. A similar pattern had already emerged in January 2020, during Donald Trump’s first term. On January 3 of that year, the United States assassinated the commander of the Quds Force (the elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard), Qassem Soleimani, near Baghdad airport, Iraq. Iran retaliated five days later, firing missiles at the US air base at Ain al-Asad, also in Iraq. Just like last year, Tehran warned in advance of the attack. No American service members were killed, but dozens later reported traumatic brain injuries. The episode reinforced the perception that Iran was seeking to manage the escalation of aggression, rather than provoking it. Trump threatened to attack Iran if protesters were killed. Reuters But the current moment is very different. Iran is emerging from one of the most serious waves of domestic unrest since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Protests that erupted in late December and early January were violently suppressed. Human rights organizations and medical professionals in the country report that thousands of people have been killed and many others have been injured or detained. It is impossible to verify the exact numbers due to the lack of access to data and an internet blackout that lasted more than two weeks. Iranian authorities have not taken responsibility for the deaths, blaming what they describe as “terrorist groups” and accusing Israel of encouraging the unrest. This narrative was defended at the highest levels of the Iranian state. The secretary of the country’s Supreme National Security Council recently said the protests should be considered a continuation of last year’s 12-day war against Israel. This framing provides an idea of ​​the authorities’ reaction, putting security first, which may have been used as justification for the scale and intensity of the repression. The scale of street protests has since decreased, but has not ended. The accusations remain unresolved and the divide between large sectors of society and the ruling system has rarely seemed so wide. On January 8 and 9, security forces reportedly lost control of parts of several cities and certain neighborhoods in the main cities. They would have regained control by force, in a forceful way. This rapid loss of control appears to have deeply worried the authorities. The calm that followed was imposed rather than negotiated, leaving the situation highly volatile. Uncompromising Rhetoric In a scenario like this, the nature of any attack by the United States becomes critical. A limited strike could allow Washington to claim military success while avoiding an immediate regional war. But it could also provide Iranian authorities with a pretext for another round of internal repression. This scenario risks further repression, mass arrests and a new wave of harsh sentences, including death sentences, for already detained protesters. At the other extreme, a larger American military campaign that significantly weakens or paralyzes the Iranian state could bring the country to the brink of chaos. The sudden collapse of central authority in a country with more than 90 million inhabitants is unlikely to generate a clean or rapid transition. On the contrary. There could be a period of prolonged instability, violence between factions and losses for the entire region, with consequences that could last for years until resolved. These risks help explain Tehran’s increasingly inflexible rhetoric. The main commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the common Armed Forces, alongside the main political authorities, warned that a possible US attack, regardless of the scale, will be treated as an act of war. These statements disturbed Iran’s neighboring countries, particularly the Gulf States that maintain American bases on their territory. A quick Iranian reaction would put these countries, along with Israel, at immediate risk, regardless of their direct involvement. And that raises the prospect of a conflict that could spread far beyond Iran and the United States. And Washington also faces constraints. Trump has repeatedly warned Iranian authorities about using violence against protesters. And at the height of the unrest, the president of the United States declared to the Iranians that “help is on the way.” These remarks circulated widely within Iran and raised expectations among protesters. The United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities during the war between Iran and Israel in June 2025. Maxar Technologies/EPA via BBC Both sides are aware of the strategic picture as a whole. Donald Trump knows that Iran today is militarily weaker than during the 12-day war. And Tehran is aware that the American president has little inclination for a large-scale open conflict. This mutual awareness can offer some reassurance, but it can also create misleading and dangerous views, with each side potentially overestimating its strength or misinterpreting its opponent’s intentions. For Trump, it is essential to find balance, whatever it may be. He needs an outcome that he can present as victory, without sending Iran into a new cycle of repression or decline into chaos. For Iranian leaders, the danger lies in timing and perception. Iran’s previous model of later symbolic retaliation may no longer be enough if its leaders believe that speed is essential to reassert deterrence abroad and control within the country, shaken by the scale of recent unrest. But a quick reaction would greatly increase the risk of miscalculation, pushing regional forces into a conflict few can afford. With both sides under intense pressure and little room for maneuver, a long game of political brinkmanship may be approaching its most dangerous moment. After all, the cost of striking the wrong balance would harm not only both governments, but millions of ordinary Iranians and the region as a whole. See the videos that are trending on g1

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