The deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and more than ten thousand US troops to the Caribbean has intensified tension between the United States and Venezuela in recent weeks. The naval operations, combined with President Donald Trump’s authorization for the CIA to carry out intelligence missions in Venezuelan territory, have placed the regime of dictator Nicolás Maduro under the greatest pressure since 2019.
Washington accuses Caracas of acting as a base for a drug trafficking network, the so-called Los Soles Cartel, which would be commanded by the dictator Maduro. The Venezuelan regime, in turn, claims that the United States military presence close to its territory is a “provocation” and an attempt by the White House to force a regime change in the country.
To analyze this tension scenario, the People’s Gazette interviewed Ricardo S. De Toma, PhD in International Strategic Studies and researcher at the Study Group on National Defense, Borders and Migrations (Gedefrom) at the Brazilian Army Command and General Staff School. De Toma spoke about possible developments in this military tension, the role of the CIA and the likely effects of a US operation against the Maduro regime.
Next, read the interview:
How do you assess the tension between the United States and Venezuela, especially after Trump’s authorization to carry out CIA operations on Venezuelan soil and the recent American military movements in the Caribbean?
It is a scenario conducive to the securitization of agendas and the readjustment of interests that are not easily recognized. The lack of legitimacy and legality of the authorities in Caracas has allowed Trump to reinforce campaign narratives: from the stereotyping and criminalization of migrants, especially Latinos, to the attribution of responsibility for the state of public security to Democrats. The overvaluation of the criminal faction Tren de Aragua (TdA) inflamed the discourse of threats and justified the expulsion of migrants to El Salvador. Subsequently, the designation of TdA as a narco-terrorist organization authorized the use of lethal force, creating a new operational framework for the Armed Forces. With the executive orders that treat the Cartel de los Soles as a threat to national security and the increase in rewards for the regime’s top brass, I think the next step could be the neutralization of Maduro.
Are there concrete signs that Washington may actually consider carrying out a military operation on Venezuelan soil, or is this entire movement in the Caribbean just a show of force and “psychological warfare”?
There is a psychological component, but no one uses a blowtorch to repel a mosquito.
There are operational rules linked to the proportionality of means and the temporality of actions, including saving resources. Military assets concentrated in the Caribbean surroundings of Venezuela have already registered the use of lethal force in the EEZ [Zona Econômica Exclusiva] and possibly in the territorial sea. Recently, B-52s [bombardeiros estratégicos da Força Aérea dos EUA] circulam per hour in FIR Maiquetia [Região de Informação de Voo da Venezuela] no records of Venezuelan Air Force reconnaissance flights. Later, US combat helicopters were spotted on the border with Trinidad and Tobago, less than 150 km from the Venezuelan coast.
What kind of repercussion would a possible US military operation on Venezuelan soil have in Latin America, especially in countries or governments allied with Maduro, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia and Brazil itself? Do you believe that a coordinated reaction could occur from these governments to support Venezuela militarily?
You mention countries democratically governed by the left, with the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua. My first observation: under the current circumstances, the only partner in crime of Maduro is Daniel Ortega. The Cuban regime has already ruled out supporting it militarily in the event of a conflict, according to the vice-chancellor. Brazil “froze” after the electoral fraud, and President Lula has already referred to Venezuela as an unpleasant regime; Even with ambiguities in the speech, I do not see Brazil as an ally. In Colombia, the president [Gustavo] Petro adopted a certain parsimony, he condemned the attacks on speedboats and stated that he does not recognize the Venezuelan government; however, there is a feeling that he is in favor of the status quo acting as an undercover partner of Maduro. If kinetic actions occur, Latin American reactions must be limited to meetings and notes of repudiation. Maduro’s regime is practically radioactive and has managed to fracture or at least erode unity among leftist rulers.
If the situation escalated, could the US also call on NATO for sanctions or operations?
In an operation, the US could request specific intelligence support or use of geographic spaces from European powers present in the Caribbean, especially the Kingdom of the Netherlands and France. In more complex matters, they would count on full British collaboration, to minimize risks and increase the effectiveness of operations.
Does Venezuela have real resistance capacity in the face of a possible North American incursion?
See, the reality is so critical that it is evident to the citizens of this country themselves. There are no efficient supply systems or military logistics capabilities. In order not to go into details, I will only mention three basic categories according to NATO manuals. As for vital subsistence supplies (Class I), there are no reserves that guarantee the ranch according to a soldier’s needs. In an oil-producing country, there is no logistics for fuels, oils and lubricants (Class III), essential for mobilizations. And neither [vamos] talk about ammunition (Class V).
What would be the role of Venezuelan militias and other Latin American armed groups within the Maduro regime’s defense strategy?
The Venezuelan population itself calls the militia members “milancianos” or “milancions”. The people even feel compassion for them for the needs and extreme level of need of these people who are sent to improvised acts and who receive, in return, some food or economic bonuses. Others assume it is some distraction or joke. As a Venezuelan, I see this as yet another act of political perversity. What does exist are criminal cells “collectives”, “unions”, “trains”, gangs and factions with a kind of charter to frighten, extort and control areas (“communes”, “zones of peace”, “quadrants of peace”); these groups are allowed to commit crimes under logical let it happenas long as they do not confront State security bodies. The presence of the ELN is also known [Exército de Libertação Nacional, guerrilha colombiana] and FARC dissident groups in Venezuelan territory. I understand that the interoperation of some of these criminal groups can, eventually, be combined with the tactical method of revolutionary resistance.
How can China and Russia react to a possible US military incursion in Venezuela and US military control over Latin America?
For Russia, an invasion could even be geopolitically convenient: it would attribute responsibilities to the USA and allow aggression against Ukraine to intensify. For China, Venezuela has become a headache, especially due to its insolvency in fulfilling contractual obligations that generated a large debt. The Maduro regime tries to sell the idea that Russia and China are Venezuela’s strategic partners, and in fact some agreements have been signed; however, in my opinion, this is nothing more than lip service. It is worth remembering the fate of Bashar al-Assad after the great Russian support campaign in Syria and the recent reception of Ahmed al-Sharaa by Putin himself in Moscow.
Can Brazil be affected by this escalation, directly or indirectly?
It depends on several factors. If Trump authorizes operations aimed at selling the news without resolving the supposed threat, Venezuela could experience the fracture of the national state and the proliferation of subversive groups that erode order, increasing migratory flows and directly affecting Brazil. Likewise, any miscalculation in North American operations could lead to this scenario. Among other risks, I do not rule out sanctions on Brazil if the country leads a regional initiative to politically and diplomatically repudiate US operations.
What should Brazil’s diplomatic and defense stance be in the face of this situation of regional tension?
Comply with constitutional principles, in particular, the mission of guaranteeing the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the repudiation of terrorism, understanding that respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention must also admit non-indifference. Brazilian intelligence needs to identify who is the enemy of the Venezuelan people, listening to the Venezuelans themselves who will be Brazilians tomorrow.
Does the CIA currently have the capacity to overthrow the Maduro regime without the need for a military operation on Venezuelan soil?
The CIA never stopped operating in Venezuela. Such actions should not be understood as permanent missions: each action-operation has specific objectives in time, space and circumstances. The CIA did a lot of things during the government of [Hugo] Chávez that were not even admitted or publicly denounced. The same thing happened with Maduro, including involving the filtration of Cuban G-2 agents, recently there was that event involving personnel held at the Argentine embassy, under the representation of Brazil, the so-called “extractions” illustrate this type of operations, clean, confidential and surgical. Likewise, I do not rule out the presence of the Mossad [agência de inteligência de Israel]given the presence of Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists in the country. Trump made this comment deliberately. Today’s Venezuela is a big deal for intelligence services around the world.
