Despite the public discourse of friendship and “bound” cooperation, Russia is maintaining an increasingly suspicious stance in the face of the advancement of Chinese influence in its territory and areas of strategic interest.
An internal memorandum of the Federal Security Service (FSB), obtained by the American newspaper New York Times In June and authenticated by Western agencies, he revealed how the Russian intelligence summit sees the Beijing regime not only as an economic partner, but also as rival and potential threat in multiple flanks – from technological spy to territorial dispute.
According to the document, which circulated among FSB strategic sectors, the fear that China widen its influence on Moscow -controlled regions, such as Central Asia, Extreme East and Arctic, is at the center of Russian security apparatus concerns. The text details the implementation of a special counterintelligence program, named “ENTENT-4”, created days before the invasion of Ukraine, precisely to contain possible attempts at espionage and Chinese co-optation at a time of vulnerability for Kremlin.
According to the report, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Chinese attempts to recruit government officials, scientists, journalists, and Russian entrepreneurs have significantly grew significantly. These investers include pressures, promises of financial benefits and attempts to obtain strategic information. To respond to these threats, the FSB has determined the reinforcement of Russian citizens surveillance with Beijing bonds, especially those who work or study in China. Recommended measures include in -person warning meetings and constant monitoring of the about 20,000 Russian students living in Chinese territory.
Memorandum also details orders for the “constant accumulation of information” about Russian citizens who use the Chinese application WeChatincluding telephone invasion and data analysis through FSB specialized tools. Concern goes beyond traditional espionage, covering possible attempts at historical and political manipulation. The document cites, for example, that Chinese academics have sought evidence of the presence of former Chinese peoples in Russian regions of the Far East. In addition, he points out that in 2023 the Chinese regime published official maps attributing Chinese historical names to cities of Siberia and the Far East Russian.
For Paul Kolbe, former CIA officer and researcher at Harvard heard by New York Timesthe Russian posture confirms an old principle of secret services: “There are no intelligence services friendly. No need to scratch much to find, in any Russian officer, deep distrust of China. In the long run it is a potential threat, despite the useful partnership,” he said.
In parallel to the reinforcement in internal surveillance, the FSB has guided caution in the diplomatic field. According to the document, Russian officers received orders not to publicly mention China as a threat, avoiding creating open political crises. Analysts point out that this stance highlights Moscow’s dilemma: Russia increasingly depends on partnership with Beijing to circumvent western sanctions and keeping its economy running, but fears losing influence and control in strategic areas – especially in the face of Chinese advancement in the energy, mining, military technology and Arctic access sectors.
The document also points to growing concern with Chinese performance with the Mercenary Group Wagner and Beijing’s interest in importing Russian military knowledge, especially in the areas of drone and aviation. According to the report, China would be prioritizing the recruitment of former employees of Russian institutes and defense factories, taking advantage of the closure of Soviet programs and the instability caused by war.
